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CIVIL PROCEDURE:

OHIO FORGOES PROBABLE CAUSE ON ORDERS FOR OBTAINING NONTESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE FROM A JUVENILE-In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting of a Juvenile, 42

Ohio St. 3d 124, 537 N.E.2d 1286 (1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution commands that "no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause."' The
probable cause criteria requires a law enforcement officer to have facts
and circumstances within his knowledge sufficient for a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been committed.' The United
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to relax the probable cause
standard imposed by the Framers to prevent arbitrary governmental
intrusions upon individual privacy. 3 However, in 1969, the Supreme
Court suggested that "because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though
there is no probable cause in the traditional sense." 4 Both state legislatures' and courts 6 have recognized the implications of this suggestion
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). The Brinegar Court stated that
the probable cause standard helps safeguard citizens "from rash and unreasonable interferences
with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime." Id. at 176. The Court recognized that law
enforcement officers might err but any mistake would be that of a reasonable person. Id. According to the Court, probable cause provides a practical, nontechnical compromise between the competing goals of protecting citizens from officials' acts of whim or caprice and aiding efficient law
enforcement. Id.
3. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (citing Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959)). In Dunaway, the Court refused to weigh the reasonableness of searches
or seizures lacking probable cause. Id. The Dunaway Court stated that "[hiostility to seizures
based on mere suspicion was a prime motivation for the adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
The Court feared that "the protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in
the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases."
Id.
4. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment).
5. A number of state legislatures have enacted statutes which would appear to be based on
the Davis Court's dicta. See ARIz. REV.STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (1978) (Magistrates may issue
orders based on reasonable cause for belief that a crime has been committed when the evidence
will aid identification of the person who committed the crime. This statute limits the scope, manner and duration of a-detention and requires that the evidence be relevant to the specific crime
being investigated.); IDAHO CODE § 19-625(1)(B) (1987) (authorizing warrants when "[r]easonable grounds exist, which may or may not amount to probable cause, to believe that the identified
or particularly described individual committed the criminal offense"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 810.6
(Supp. 1990) (permitting order for nontestimonial identification, not otherwise practicably obtainable, which will materially aid in determining who committed the crime when there is probable
1.
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and have struggled with its application. The Ohio Supreme Court, in
deciding In re Order Requiring Fingerprintingof a Juvenile,, interpreted the dicta in Davis v. Mississippi8 as authorizing detention of a
juvenile for fingerprinting without probable cause.' The court held that
Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.313(A)(1), which permits fingerprinting or photographing of a child with the consent of a juvenile court
judge, 10 thwarts neither the United States Constitution" nor the Ohio
Constitution. 2
This casenote initially examines the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in In re Order Requiring Fingerprintingof a Juvenile. Then, it
discusses the circumstances in which the United States Supreme Court
recognizes that the requirements of the fourth amendment may be met
without a warrant or with a warrant issued on less than probable cause.
Next, the casenote compares the Ohio Supreme Court's decision with
the facts, relationships and public interests identified in United States
Supreme Court decisions which justify a relaxing of the fourth amendment requirements. Finally, it determines whether the Ohio decision
fits within the reasoning of these cases.

cause to believe a felony has been committed and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the
named individual committed the felony); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3303 (1989) (allowing an order to
obtain for identifying physical characteristics when there is probable cause to believe an offense
has been committed and the named individual has refused, or there is reason to believe he will
refuse to voluntarily provide the evidence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-271 (1988) (Judges may issue
an order to obtain nontestimonial identification upon request of a prosecutor. This statute enumerates acceptable types of nontestimonial evidence.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8-1 (1990) (requiring
probable cause for belief that a crime has been committed and a "reason to believe the suspect
committed it").
6. See State v. Grijalva, IIl Ariz. 476, 478, 533 P.2d 533, 535, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873
(1975) (statute permitting temporary detention to obtain physical characteristics evidence is constitutional though it-only requires reasonable cause to believe there is a connection between the
person detained and the crime being investigated); People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 32 (Colo.
1981) (Colorado Criminal Procedure Rule 41.1, requiring only "reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect the person described in the affidavit committed the
offense," does not violate the United States Constitution or the Colorado Constitution). But see
State v. Evans, 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788 (1983) (Nebraska's Identifying Physical Characteristic Act implicitly requires probable cause); In re an Investigation into the Death of Abe A.,
56 N.Y.2d 288, 295, 437 N.E.2d 265, 269, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 10 (1982) (interpreting Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), as holding that "the seizure of a person can never be undertaken
for less than probable cause").
7. 42 Ohio St. 3d 124, 537 N.E.2d 1286, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 165 (interim ed. 1989).
8.

394 U.S. at 727.

9.

42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.

10.
11.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2151.313(A)(1) (Baldwin 1987).

See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
12. The Ohio Constitution states, "no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause."
CONST. art. I, § 14.
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II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1986, the Madison Fire District was investigating a series of
pipe bomb explosions which occurred in Madison, Ohio."3 The Lake
County prosecutor requested that Judge Richard A. Hoose,.of the Lake
County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, issue an order requiring the fingerprinting of a juvenile who, though a suspect, was not
under arrest or in court custody." The request was made pursuant to
Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.313(A)(1), which provides that "no
child shall be fingerprinted or photographed in the investigation of any
violation of law without the consent of the juvenile judge."' 5 Judge
Hoose issued the fingerprinting order after reviewing an affidavit of
Captain Norm Chaffee of the Madison Fire District as well as the testimony of both Captain Chaffee and another fire district officer. 6 The
testimony revealed that these officers suspected the juvenile was involved in the placement and explosion of numerous homemade pipe
bombs in the area.' The judge's original order did not articulate probable cause for detaining the juvenile for fingerprinting. 8
A Madison Township police officer attempted to execute the fingerprint order on May 29, 1986.11 The juvenile refused to accompany
the officer to the station for fingerprinting. 0 The juvenile's attorney
filed a motion to quash the order on June 2, 1986.21 The Lake County
juvenile court denied the motion, finding that the fingerprint order
complied with the United States Constitution as well as section
2151.313.22 Specifically, the juvenile judge held that the decision to order the fingerprinting was within his authority under section
2151.313.12 The juvenile court's decision stated that "what infringement there may be on the juvenile's Fourth Amendment rights [is]
minimal at best for the time of detention required at the police station
for the sole purpose of obtaining his fingerprints and is outweighed by
concerns for the safety of the community in investigating" the pipe
13. In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting of a Juvenile, 42 Ohio St. 3d 124, 124, 537
N.E.2d 1286, 1287, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 165 (interim ed. 1989).
14. Id.
15. § 2151.313(A)(1).
16. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 124, 537 N.E.2d at 1287.
17. Id. The Madison Fire District had information from both students and teachers that the
juvenile had been discussing the construction of homemade pipe bombs at school. Id. at 127, 537
N.E.2d at 1289.
18. Id. at 125, 537 N.E.2d at 1287.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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bomb explosions. 4
The juvenile appealed .thel juvenile court's judgment to. the Court
5
of Appeals,, Eleventh Appellate District, Lake County. The juvenile
contended that the statute was either unconstitutional per se or it had
been applied in a way which infringed upon his constitutional rights."
The court of appeals noted -that, since acts of the Ohio General Assem-

bly are presumed to be constitutional, it was obliged to construe section

2151.313 in a way which sustained its validity, if possible." Since the
juvenile had not brought a declaratory judgment action asking the
court to review the per se constitutionality of the statute, the court of

28
appeals declared the statute to be constitutional. The court reasoned

that its review had not revealed any ambiguities nor2 had the appellant
suggested that any existed in the statutory language. When the intermediate court reviewed the juvenile court's application of the statute to
the facts of the case,30it found the juvenile court had acted properly and
within its authority.
The Ohio Supreme Court granted the juvenile's motion for leave

32
to appea 1 and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 2151.31333
which permits .a juvenile court judge to issue an order without probable
4
cause when three criteria are met: (1) there is an articulable and specific basis for suspecting criminal activity (there had been pipe bomb

explosions in the Madison area and such explosions violated Ohio
law);

5

(2) the ordered intrusion is justified by substantial law enforce-

24. Id.
25. In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting of a Juvenile, No. 12-027 (11th Dist. Ct. Ohio
Nov. 6, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Ohio file).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 125, 537 N.E.2d at 1287.
32. Id. at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The court did not identify the specific nature of the criminal activity. It can be inferred
that possession of a pipe bomb would violate laws against possession of weapons. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.17 (Baldwin 1986) (prohibiting anyone from knowingly acquiring, having, carrying,
or using any dangerous ordinance, a felony of the fourth degree). Ohio law defines dangerous
ordinances to include explosive devices and incendiary devices. § 2923.11. The Ohio courts have
not addressed the issue of how to define a pipe bomb but a pipe bomb would appear to fit within
the description .of an explosive deyice "designed or specially adapted to cause physical harm to
persons or property by. means of an explosion, and consisting of an explosive substance or agency
and the means to detonate." § 2923.11(H). The setting and exploding of a pipe bomb would
probably be classified as a dangerous ordinance within § 2923.11 and as an act of arson. §
2909.03 (arson includes creating a risk of physical harm to structures owned or controlled by the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
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ment interests (prevention of further bombing incidents);s and (3) the
intrusion is limited in scope, purpose, and duration (taking the juvenile
to the police station solely for fingerprinting)." Justices Sweeney and

Douglas, in separate dissents, argued that the majority's interpretation
of section 2151.313 is contrary to the fourth amendment's requirement
that a warrant must be issued on probable cause. 8
III. BACKGROUND
Historically, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
the Framers of the Constitution intended the fourth amendment to provide protection of an individual's right to privacy and an individual's
interest in being free from arbitrary government interference in the
form of a search or seizure.8 9 The Supreme Court summarized the historical interpretation of the fourth amendment restraints in Dunaway v.
New York.'
[T] he Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures
of persons was analyzed in terms of arrest, probable cause for arrest, and

warrants based on such probable cause. The basic principles were relatively simple and straightforward: The term "arrest" was synonymous
with those seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment. While warrants
were not required in all circumstances, the requirement of probable
cause, as elaborated in numerous precedents, was treated as absolute. 1

The mode of protection supplied in the fourth amendment is the
warrant, which can only be issued on probable cause grounds. 42 The
state such as school houses, by means of fire or explosion).
36. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 128, 130, 537 N.E.2d at 1289, 1292.
39. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (basic purpose
of
fourth amendment is to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions
by government officials); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (fourth amendment's
overriding function is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusions
by
the state).
40. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). In Dunaway, the State argued that probable cause was not
necessary for an officer to bring an individual in for "custodial questioning." Id. at 202. The
State
advocated a balancing test which would determine whether the police conduct was reasonable
given the circumstances. Id. at 213. The Court stated that, except for narrowly defined
circumstances, the results of balancing tests conducted in prior court decisions were that
only those
seizures supported by probable cause are reasonable. Id. at 214. The narrowly defined
exceptions
include stop and frisk searches and brief questioning to check for illegal immigrants.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (questioning occupants of stopped
vehicles
near border justified due to special economic and social problems of illegal immigration);
Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968) (stop and frisk justified due. to potentially imminent threat of
danger to
officer and community).
41. 442 U.S. at 208 (footnotes omitted).
Camara, 387 U.S.
Published42.by eCommons,
1989at 528.
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fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
the place to be
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
4
seized.
searched, and the persons or things to be
The structure of the amendment suggests two parts: (1) a citizen's
right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures and (2) a
requirement that warrants will not be issued without probable cause."
The United States Supreme Court traditionally interpreted the warrant
clause to be the controlling phrase, and has ruled that searches and
seizures are presumed to be per se unreasonable unless carried out pursuant to a warrant."
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
4
fourth amendment protects an individual's right to privacy. ' The Dunaway Court stated that the probable cause prerequisite to the issuance
of a warrant reflects "the best compromise" between the opposing interests of the state-protecting the community and the individ47
ual-protecting against unreasonable interferences with privacy.
Since the probable cause standard applies to all warrants, there is no
need for the courts to conduct a case by case balancing of the state and
individual interests.48 The fourth amendment protection is also enforce49
able against state encroachment through the fourteenth amendment.
A.

Recognized Exceptions

The fourth amendment is not, however, an absolute prohibition
50
against warrantless searches and seizures. A warrantless arrest is permitted in three circumstances: (1) the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to'believe that the person has committed a felony, (2)
43.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

44.

S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 33 (2d ed. 1984).

45. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (preferring the warrant process because the
warrant itself helps provide assurance that interference with the interests protected by the fourth
amendment will be less severe); see also S. SALTZBURG, supra note 44, at 34.
46. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (1967). "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Id.
47. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)).
48. Id.

49. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (right to be free from arbitrary
intrusion by state police is part of "the concept of ordered liberty" and is therefore protected by
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (inquiry is not whether
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
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the officer has probable cause to believe the person committed a misdemeanor and (a) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested or
(b) may cause injury to himself or others or damage property unless
immediately arrested, or (3) the individual committed a offense in the

officer's presence. 51
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized a number
of exceptions where, due to special circumstances, the law enforcement
officers are empowered to search or seize without a warrant even

though there is not probable cause for a warrantless arrest.5 The Court
identified the following exigent circumstances which justify relaxation
of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement: (1) the safety of the
officer or the community," (2) the risk of destruction of evidence if not

immediately obtained, 4 and (3) the possibility that the suspect will flee
and not be located at all or not be easily located after a warrant is

obtained.55 The Supreme Court has required that, in cases involving
51.

Id. at 422 n. 11.See also Watson, 423 U.S. at 411 (felony arrests in public places); S.
supra note 44, at 134. The Watson Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3061(a)(3), which
allows postal officers and employees to "make arrests without warrant for felonies ...
if they
have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing
such a felony," as requiring probable cause. Id. at 415. The Court justified its interpretation by
reasoning that Congress had made a judgment that it was not unreasonable for postal workers to
arrest without a warrant as long as there was probable cause for the arrest. Id. While the Court
was willing to uphold Congress' determination that the arrest may be made without a warrant, the
Watson majority was unwilling to waive the probable cause component of the fourth amendment
even though the statute explicitly states the arrest may be made when there is reasonable, not
probable, grounds for the arrest.
52. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (right to stop and question vehicle
occupants about their citizenship when there is reason to suspect illegal activity); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (right to stop vehicles and question occupants when border
patrol is aware of specific, articulable fact that reasonably warrants suspicion that the vehicles
contain aliens who may be illegally in the country); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
(limited right to search when officer has reason to believe suspect is armed and dangerous); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (limited right to "stop and frisk" an individual in interests of protecting officer's or community's safety).
53. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). The police officer has an immediate interest "in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him." Id.
54. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (removal of fingernail scrapings is a
legitimate warrantless search when search is incident to a valid detention); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (testing for blood alcohol is a legitimate warrantless search when there
is probable cause for arrest). In both Cupp and Schmerber, the Court emphasized that the police
had probable cause to arrest the suspects. 412 U.S. at 296; 384 U.S. at 770. The same facts which
provide probable cause for an arrest provide probable cause for a warrantless search whether such
search is conducted before (Cupp) or after (Schmerber) the actual arrest. Id. The Schmerber
Court added a limitation on obtaining physical evidence such as a blood sample without a warrant: "In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests [in having one's body free from unjustified intrusions] require law officers
to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search." 384 U.S.
at 770.
55.
e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981) (detaining occupants while
Published by See,
eCommons,
1989
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such exigent circumstances, the governmental interest must be baland the individual's
anced against the individual's interest in privacy
56
Court has recogThe
expectation of being free from such intrusions.
safety as
nized law enforcement needs and the interest of community
5 The Court has
justifying minimal intrusions in limited circumstances.
or
also identified special enforcement problems 8which justify a search
seizure absent a warrant or probable cause.
In addition to recognizing situations where no warrant is required
to conduct a search, the United States Supreme Court has identified
the
circumstances where, although a warrant is needed 9to conduct
v.
Camara
In
cause.
search, there is not a requirement of probable
60 the Court was asked to decide whether an adminisMunicipal Court,
1
trative search could be authorized and, conducted without a warrant.
The California state court of appeals had upheld a housing search abthe
sent a warrant, ruling that the municipal ordinance authorizing
a
of
"part
was
it
search did not violate the fourth amendment because
in
regulatory scheme which [was] essentially civil rather than criminal
and [could]
nature" and the right of inspection. was "limited in scope
'6 2 The Camara
circumstances.
not be exercised under unreasonable
Court determined that an administrative housing search is a significant
a
intrusion on the rights that the fourth amendment guards and such
warrantless search lacks the fourth amendment's procedural
safeguards. 3
Once the Supreme Court determined that the administrative
Court
search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, the Camara
went on to consider whether probable cause is the appropriate standard
6
as
for issuing such a warrant. The Supreme Court justified the search
unsafe
are
that
furthering the public interest in preventing conditions
flight in the event
the premises are being searched is justified by a legitimate interest in preventing
(hot pursuit).
(1967)
294
U.S.
387
Hayden,
v.
Warden
found);
that incriminating evidence is
56. Dunaway, 422 U.S. at 209-10.
57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.
economic
58. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-79 (1975). The
represents a
and social problems created by an uncontrolled influx of aliens at the nation's borders
border patrol is
unique enforcement problem whose effectiveness will be adversely impacted if the
to traditional
themselves
lend
not
do
required to obtain a warrant. Id. These special circumstances
Id.
standards.
cause
warrant procedures or probable
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387
59. See, e.g.,
U.S. 541 (1967).
60. 387 U.S. at 525.
61.

id.

137, 46 Cal.
62. Id.at 528 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 237 Cal. App. 2d 128,
Rptr. 585, 591 (1965)).
63. Id.at 534.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
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or hazardous to public health. 65 Due to the special nature of the interest, the Court recognized that the goals of the administrative agency
may be undermined if the agency can only conduct its searches when it
has probable cause to believe there is a housing code violation."6 The
California agency was concerned that, if probable cause was required,
area inspections would be eliminated as an effective enforcement tool. 67
The Camara Court approved a reasonableness requirement in lieu
of probable cause after balancing the need for the search against the
invasion which the search entailed. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court looked at three factors: (1) the long history of judicial and public
acceptance of housing inspections, (2) the public interest in preventing,
identifying and abating dangerous conditions, and (3) the limited nature of the invasion because the inspection was neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovering criminal evidence.69
The Supreme Court employed a similar test in New York v. Burger7 to justify a warrantless search of an automobile junkyard. The
Court emphasized that the operator of a business has less of an expectation of privacy in his commercial property than an individual does in
his home. 71 This expectation is diminished because of the amount of
regulation in the industry in which the businessman operates; the
greater the regulation of a particular industry, the less the individual
expects to be free from close governmental scrutiny. 72 When this diminished expectation of privacy is coupled with the government's special need for a regulatory scheme which can only be advanced through
warrantless searches, the state is justified in authorizing warrantless
searches without fear of violating fourth amendment prohibitions.73
The state's authorization must, however, place certain controls on the
search so as to ensure that the search meets the reasonableness criteria
of the fourth amendment. 4 The statute must advise the businessman
that searches may be made pursuant to law and it must define the
scope of the search (the times it may be conducted, who is authorized
65. Id. at 535.
66. Id. at 536. Traditionally, agency searches are part of an area-wide inspection and
are
not specific to an individual or residence unless there is a reported violation. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 539.
69. Id. at 537.
70. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
71. Id. at 700.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 702-03. The Court reasoned that requiring a warrant may warn the businessman
of the pending search and thus defeat the purpose of the inspection because he could
take steps to
either avoid the search in its entirety or remedy any statutory violations before the
search is
conducted. Id.
74. Id. at 703.
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in a manner which will limit the inspecting ofto conduct the search)
7
ficers' discretion.
In the cases dealing with administrative searches, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that there may be situations where,
although a warrant is required, probable cause is not a prerequisite to
76
the issuance of the warrant. The Supreme Court has extended the
exceptions to the fourth amendment's requirement to circumstances
where, because of a special relationship between the official and individual subject to the search, no warrant or probable 7 cause will be
needed to conduct the search. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1 the Supreme
Court easily dismissed the idea that a warrant would be necessary for a
she had
school principal to search a student's purse for evidence that
1 8 The napolicy.
been smoking in the rest room in violation of school
ture of the school setting itself indicates that a warrant would be
counterproductive to maintaining the "swift and informal disciplinary
17 9
procedures needed in schools." The T.L.O. Court went on to hold that
"[t]he school setting also requires some modification of80the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search." The Supreme
Court stated:
'[Probable cause' is not an irreducible requirement of a valid
search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that
searches and seizures be reasonable, and although 'both the concept of
probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonablein certain limited circumstances neither is
ness of a search, ...
81
.required.'
To determine whether probable cause is a requirement of a reasonable
search in the school setting, the T.L.O. Court balanced the governmental interest in providing teachers and administrators with the freedom
to maintain order against the individual student's interest and expectation of privacy. 82 The T.L.O. Court recognized that the students' expectation of privacy had to be balanced against the substantial interest of
88
school officials in maintaining discipline. In order to preserve the control required in the school environment, the Supreme Court held that

Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 59-75.
77. 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
78. Id.
75.

.79.
80.

Id.

Id.
(Powell, J.,
81. Id. (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)
concurring)).
82. Id. at 341.
83. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
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school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student
who is under their authority nor need they have probable cause before
conducting a search. 8 The Court concluded:
[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with
the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of
the search has vi6lated or is violating the law.85
The Supreme Court found that the schoolchildren's interest in privacy
can be accommodated by allowing teachers and administrators to conduct a limited search if it is reasonable at its inception and is related to
the circumstances justifying the search.86 The Court found that, in the
facts of the T.L.O. case, the search was both reasonable in its inception
and extent.87
In Griffin v. Wisconsin,8 8 the United States Supreme Court held

that a warrantless search of a probationer's home by a probation official does not violate the fourth amendment, even though the state statute which authorizes the search only- requires reasonable grounds. 9
The probationer's home is protected by the fourth amendment.just as
others' homes are; searches must be reasonable.90 However, when special law enforcement needs exist which make the warrant and probable
cause requirements impractical, past decisions had authorized modifying the fourth amendment's requirement that reasonableness be
equated with a warrant supported by probable cause. 1
The Griffin Court found a parallel between a state's probation system and its school system, in which " 'special needs' beyond normal law
enforcement . . . may justify departures from the usual warrant and

probable cause requirements." 92 The nature of probation itself suggested a need for special consideration; probation is a step in a process
of punishment which ranges from a severe penalty (solitary confinement) to a minimum interruption in everyday life (mandatory community service).93 Since probation is a step of punishment, the probationer
84. Id. at 340-41.
85. Id. at 341.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 345, 347.
88. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
89. Id. at 872.
90. Id. at 873.
91. Id. To support this proposition, the Griffin Court cited a number of Supreme Court
precedents which dealt with administrative search procedures. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S.
at 702-03; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39.

92. 483 U.S. at 873-74.
93. Id. at 874.
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has a diminished expectation of liberty; his liberty is conditioned on
observance of restrictions on activity and movement to which most citizens are not subject. 94 The probationary system must be able to superconditions. 9
vise the probationer to ensure that he meets his probation
Such supervision represents a substantial government interest which
supports an infringement on constitutional rights which would be unac96
ceptable if applied to the public at large.
The Griffin Court reasoned that requiring a warrant and probable

recause would "unduly disrupt[]" the probation regime and "would
'1 7 The conduce the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement.'

trolling factor in the Court's determination was that there exists "an
ongoing supervisory relationship-and one that is not, or at least not
entirely, adversarial-between the object of the search and the decisionmaker."' 8 The Court recognized that "the probation, agency must

be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than the Fourth
Amendment would otherwise require in order to intervene before a pro99
bationer does damage to himself or society."
B. FingerprintingWithout Probable Cause - Within The Recognized
Exceptions?
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized excep1 00
tions to the probable cause standard, the lower courts have generally

for finassumed that probable cause is required to detain an individual
10 However., in.
gerprinting in connection with a criminal investigation.
Davis v. Mississippi, 0 2 the State argued that detention for fingerprinting does not require probable cause. Davis had been questioned and

fingerprinted without a warrant in connection with a rape investigation. 10 He was subsequently taken into custody without a warrant,
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id.

...
See supra text accompanying notes 46-96.
437
295,
288,
N.Y.2d
56
A.,
Abe
of
.101. See, e.g., In re an Investigation into the Death
N.E.2d 265, 269, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 10 (1982) (court decisions and state statutes which authorize
seizures of physical evidence on a standard lower than probable cause are not constitutionally
firm).
102. 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969). The State admitted that the police lacked probable cause
when they first fingerprinted Davis. Id.
103. 394 U.S. at 722. In a period of four days, the police interrogated Davis several timhes at
his home, in a car, and at police headquarters. Id. According to the police, Davis was exhibited to
the victim in her hospital room to "[sharpen] the victim's description of her assailant by providing
'a gauge to go by on size and color.' " Id. at 722-23. The victim did not identify Davis as her
100.

assailant. Id. at 723.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
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confined in jail overnight for questioning and fingerprinted a second
time. " The Supreme Court suggested that detaining suspects for fingerprinting under limited circumstances might not violate the fourth
amendment. 10 5 The Court was not addressing the issue of whether detention for fingerprinting could be accomplished without a probable
cause warrant. 1°0
On the facts,107 the Davis Court held that fingerprint evidence
may not be obtained in an investigatory effort without complying with
the fourth amendment's constraints on unreasonable search and
seizures.108 The Court excluded the fingerprint evidence as invalid because it was obtained from the juvenile' petitioner without a warrant. 10 9
The Davis Court ruled that illegally obtained fingerprints are inadmissible evidence because the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule applies to the investigatory stage. The amendment's purpose is "to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry,
whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions'."110 The Court emphatically stated that investigatory detentions
for fingerprinting are subject to the limitations of the fourth
amendment."'
The Davis Court then asked whether, under "narrowly defined circumstances," a detention for fingerprinting might comply with the
fourth amendment's constraints absent "probable cause in the traditional sense." '12 The Court emphasized the unique nature of fingerprint
evidence. 11 8 "Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.
Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any
individual, since the police need only one set of each person's prints." '
In the Court's reflections, the type of evidence to be obtained by the
search is a material factor to be considered in determining whether or
not probable cause is required for a warrant. Fingerprinting is a relia-

104. Id. at 723.
105. In support of its dicta, the Court cited Camara which relaxed the probable cause requirement for warrants authorizing administrative searches. Id. at 727.
106. Id. at 728.
107. The Meridian police over a period of two weeks, brought a number of black youths in
for questioning and fingerprinting in relation to a rape investigation. Id. at 722. In each instance,
the police had not obtained a warrant for the seizure nor did the police have probable cause for a
warrant or arrest. Id.
108. Id. at 726-27.
109. Id. at 725.
110. Id. at 726-27.
111. Id. at 727.
112. Id.
113. Id.
Id.
Published114.
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ble identification tool and, since fingerprints can not be destroyed by
the suspect, they may be obtained at any time; detention need not be
unexpected or inconvenient. 11 5 Therefore, the Court speculated that detention for fingerprinting may be less intrusive on personal security
"
than other types of police searches or seizures. However, the Davis
and it had
Court emphasized that it was not faced with such an issue
"no occasion in this case" to make such a determination.1 17
The United States Supreme Court renewed the speculation that an
individual may be legally detained for fingerprinting without a proba1
ble cause warrant in Hayes v. Florida. Police were investigating a
series of burglary-rapes and considered Hayes to be their prime suspect
119
despite the absence of specific information linking him to the crime.
Without seeking a warrant, the police officers went to Hayes home and
20
to acrequested he submit to fingerprinting. When he was reluctant
1 Rather
him."
arrest
would
they
company them, the officers told him
than be arrested, Hayes acquiesced, accompanied the officers to the
found in the
station and was fingerprinted. 2 His prints matched those
3
.
home of the victim and Hayes was formally arrested

2

The Hayes Court found that fingerprint evidence that had been
obtained absent a warrant is inadmissible; there had been no probable
2
cause for an arrest nor had Hayes consented to fingerprinting. In its
opinion, the Hayes Court provided additional clues as to when it might
recognize fingerprint evidence obtained without a probable cause warrant. It specifically identified "brief detention[s] in the field for the
purpose of fingerprinting" on reasonable suspicion as possibly being
within fourth amendment constraints. 2 5 The Court elaborated that
there is support in its prior decisions for fingerprinting seizures "if
there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal
act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will
establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and if the
procedure is carried out with dispatch. 1 26
The Hayes Court noted that some states had acted on its sugges-

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 728.
118. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
119. Id. at 812.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 812-13.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 816.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
126. Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
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tion in Davis v. Mississippi.'2 7 The Court pointed out that the state
courts are not in agreement on the validity of legislative actions to circumvent the fourth amendment's prohibition of warrants issued without probable cause.' 2 8 Since the Supreme Court has not accepted a
case for review where this principle is at issue, it remains for the state

legislatures and courts to struggle with how to maintain the delicate

balance between the states' interests and the individual rights implicated in the Davis and Hayes dicta.

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Decision

The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis of In re Order Requiring Fingerprintingof a Juvenile"9 by noting a distinction between
juvenile and criminal proceedings. 3-0 Although juvenile proceedings are

not criminal in nature, the juvenile is entitled to the same fourth
amendment protections as provided to an adult. 3 ' The Ohio Supreme
Court questioned "[u]nder what circumstances may a juvenile court
judge order the fingerprinting of a juvenile pursuant to R.C.
2151.313(A)(1)."' 3 2 Since the detention of a juvenile for fingerprinting

127. Id. at 817.
128. Id.
129. 42 Ohio St. 3d 124, 537 N.E.2d 1286, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 165 (interim ed. 1989).
130. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 125-26, 537 N.E.2d at 1287 (citing State v. Davis, 56 Ohio St. 2d
51, 381 N.E.2d 641 (1978) and State v. Carder, 9 Ohio St. 2d 1, 11, 222 N.E.2d 620, 627
(1966)). In Carder, the juvenile had argued that his fingerprints were not admissible evidence
because they were taken on a criminal card instead of a civilian card as required by § 2151.31
(currently § 2151.313). 9 Ohio St. 2d at 10-11, 222 N.E.2d at 627. The court stated that the
statute requires juvenile fingerprints to be imprinted on a civilian card in order "to conform to the
theory that juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature" and not to determine the admissibility
of the evidence. Id. In State v. Davis, the court applied this principle to allow fingerprints taken in
violation of § 2151.313 to be admitted as evidence; the juvenile had voluntarily consented to the
fingerprinting. 56 Ohio St. 2d at 56-57, 381 N.E.2d at 645. The opinion stated that, though a
violation of § 2151.313 warrants criminal prosecution, it does not govern the admissibility of the
evidence in a criminal case. Id. at n.3 (violations of § 2151.313 are misdemeanors of the fourth
degree per § 2151.99(B)). See also In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 74, 249 N.E.2d 808, 811
(1969) (juvenile court proceedings are civil, not criminal, in nature and imply the protection, not
punishment, of minors). The court could also look to the purpose of the juvenile code itself to
support the principle that juvenile proceedings are not criminal in nature. The code further stipulates that its purpose is to "provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development
of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code." § 2151.01(A). The juvenile code requires that the courts liberally construe its provisions to attain the goal "to protect the public
interest in removing the consequences of criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent acts and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care, and
rehabilitation." §-2151.01(B).
131. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 126, 537 N.E.2d at 1287-88 (citing State v. Davis, 56 Ohio St. 2d
51, 56, 381 N.E.2d 641, 645 (1978)).
132.by Id.
at 125, 5371989
N.E.2d at 1287.
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is within the scope of the fourth amendment 33 and section 14 of article
I of the Ohio Constitution, 3 the Ohio court stated that "[tihe crucial
question then is whether this intrusion can be constitutionally justified
in the absence of a finding of probable cause.""
This statement of the issue forced the Ohio Supreme Court to consider the case primarily through statutory interpretation. The court
needed to consider several underlying issues: (1) when the statute is
applicable, (2) what the statutory language means, and (3) whether the
statute, as construed, meets federal and state constitutional requirements. 6 The Ohio Supreme Court was forced to interpret the provision of section 2151.313 that reads, "[e]xcept as provided in division
(A)(2) of this section, no childshall be fingerprinted or photographed
of any violation of law without the consent of the
in the investigation
187
juvenile judge."
The Ohio Supreme Court focused its attention on the statement in
Hayes v. Florida' 8 which suggests that, under certain circumstances,
judicial authorization of a detention for fingerprinting might be permissible on less than probable cause.139 The United States Supreme Court
had noted in Hayes that, although several states have enacted statutes
governing procedures for such seizures, the state courts are "not in accord on the validity of these efforts to insulate investigative seizures
from Fourth Amendment invalidation."
The Ohio Supreme Court focused its analysis on the Colorado Supreme Court decision, People v. Madson.1 4 1 The Madson court interpreted the Colorado statute which permits authorities to obtain nontestimonial evidence (including fingerprints) on less than probable
cause.1 4 The Madson court decided that Colorado Criminal Procedure
133. Id. at 126, 537 N.E.2d at 1288 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969)
(detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are subject to the constraints of the
fourth amendment)).
134. Article I, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides the same protections against
search and seizures as the fourth amendment in virtually identical wording. See supra note 12.
135. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 126, 537 N.E.2d at 1288.
136. The statute's constitutionality is interpreted within the context of the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at
126, 537 N.E.2d at 1287.
137. § 2151.313(A)(1). Division (A)(2) of the statute is inapplicable to the case; it governs
fingerprinting and photographing of juveniles who are under arrest or otherwise in custody for acts
which would be a felony if committed by an adult. §,2151.313(A)(2). The juvenile in question had
not been arrested, nor was he in custody at the time the prosector sought the order to obtain his
fingerprints. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 124, 537 N.E.2d at 1286.
138. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
139. Id.at 817.
140.

Id.

141. 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol15/iss2/6
142. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1. The Colorado rule requires that the order "be supported by
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Rule 41.1 passed constitutional scrutiny if the detention authorized by
the rule was supported by an affidavit which established (1) probable
cause that a crime had been committed and (2) reasonable grounds to
suspect that the individual sought to be detained had committed the
offense." 3 The Ohio court quoted extensively from the Colorado court's
opinion validating the criminal procedure authorization.'" The Ohio
opinion cited Madson's explanation of the Colorado statute as being
"an outgrowth of dicta in Davis v. Mississippi" which allows the
states
to authorize limited intrusions into privacy on less than probable cause
without violating the requirements of the fourth amendment. " 5
The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize any judge in
the state court system to issue a nontestimonial identification order,
prior to the arrest of a suspect, on affidavits establishing (1) probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed, (2) reasonable grounds
to suspect the individual as having,committed the offense and (3) material aid of the identification sought in determining whether the individual committed the offense. " 6
The Ohio Supreme Court sought to distinguish section 2151.313

from the Colorado rule by focusing on the Ohio statute's requirement
for immediate participation by the juvenile court judge." 7 The portion
of the Colorado rule, as interpreted by the Madson court, with which

the Ohio court sought to draw the distinction requires "an opportunity
at some point to subject the intrusion to the neutral and detached scrutiny of a judicial officer before the evidence obtained therefrom may be
articulable and specific facts in the form of an affidavit establishing: (1) probable cause to believe
a crime has been committed; (2) reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest,
to suspect the person described in the affidavit committed the offense." 638 P.2d at 32. The rule
also provides the judge with guidelines to ensure that the evidence is obtained in a manner which
minimizes the invasion on the individual's privacy and freedom.
(1) No person who appears under an order of appearance issued pursuant to this section (f) shall be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to cofiduct the specified nontestimonial identification procedures unless he is arrested for an offense.
(2) The order may be executed and returned only within ten days after its date.
(3) The order shall be executed in the daytime unless the issuing judge shall endorse
thereupon that it may be served at any time, because it appears that the suspect may flee
the jurisdiction if the order is not served forthwith.
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(0. The rule further stipulates that the evidence that is obtained will be
destroyed if, at the time the order is returned, probable cause does not exist to believe that the
individual in fact committed the offense named in the affidavit or any other offense. COLO. R.
CRIM. P. 41.1(0(7).
143. 638 P.2d at 32.
144. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 126-27, 537 N.E.2d at 1288.
145. Id. at 126, 537 N.E.2d at 1288 (quoting People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18, 31-32 (Colo.
1981)).
146. COLO. R. CRiM. P. 41.1(a) and (c).
147. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
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1 8 The Ohio
admitted in a criminal proceeding against the accused."
14 9
court relied on a statement in State v. Carder to make the distinction. Carder dealt with an earlier version of the statute which required
that fingerprints of children be placed on a civilian, not a criminal, card
and kept in a civilian file.' 50 The Carder court therefore linked the purpose of section 2151.313 to the theory that juvenile proceedings are not
criminal in nature and concluded the statute does not determine the
admissibility of the evidence obtained.' 5
Although the Colorado rule does address the admissibility of the
evidence obtained, 5 2 it also serves to allow criminal investigators an
opportunity to obtain nontestimonial evidence under an order issued on
less than probable cause. Apparently the Ohio Supreme Court interpreted the fact that section 2151.313 requires that "no child shall be
fingerprinted or photographed in the investigation of any violation of
53
law without the consent of the juvenile judge"' as demanding the immediate participation of the judge prior to the detention. It is unclear
how this would vary from the fourth amendment requirement that a
warrant be issued based upon probable cause. If section 2151.313 required that no child be fingerprinted without an order or warrant based
on probable cause, the immediate participation of the judge would still
be required before the investigating officers could detain a juvenile for
fingerprinting. In the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation, section
2151.313 also serves the same purpose as the Colorado rule; it allows a
prosecutor to obtain fingerprints from a juvenile under an order author54
ized by a juvenile judge even though there is not probable cause. The
Ohio court's focus on this particular statement may be misleading. The
Colorado rule also requires judicial participation before the order is issued to obtain the evidence; 55 it does not, as the opinion implies, only
require judicial intervention before the evidence is used in a criminal

148. Madson, 638 P.2d at 32.
149. 9 Ohio St. 2d 1, 11, 222 N.E.2d 620, 627 (1966) (juvenile confession is admissible
evidence when juvenile was told he was not required to talk to his questioners and he declined to
see his parents or an attorney). See also State v. Davis, 56Ohio St. 2d 51, 56, 381 N.E.2d 641,
645 (1978) (fingerprints obtained in violation of statute regulating fingerprinting of children need
not be excluded as evidence when juvenile waived his rights under the fourth amendment by
consenting to the search or seizure).
150. 9 Ohio St. 2d at 11, 222 N.E.2d at 627.
151. Id.
152. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(i).
153. § 2151.313(A)(1).
154. Id.
155. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(c)(3) requires a judge to review affidavits prior to issuing an
order for detention to obtain nontestimonial evidence. The purpose of this review is to ascertain
whether the results of the identification procedure will be a material aid in determining if the
individual did, in fact, commit the offense under investigation. See Madson, 638 P.2d at 32.
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proceeding.
The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in People v. Mad-

son 5 6 by implying similar restrictions on the juvenile court judge's authority to order fingerprinting pursuant to section 2151.313(A) (1). 15
The court required that, before the juvenile court judge can issue the
order, "there must be a finding that: (1) there is an articulable and
specific basis in fact for suspecting criminal activity; (2) the intrusion is
justified by substantial law enforcement interests; and (3) the intrusion
is limited in scope, purpose and duration.' 8
In applying these tests to the facts, the court found that there was
sufficient evidence to justify the order. 159 The juvenile court judge was
informed that there had been numerous pipe bomb explosions in the
area. 16 0 The affidavit of Captain Chaffee, his testimony and the testi-

mony of the other fire district officer, indicated that students and teachers had indicated that the juvenile in question had been discussing the
construction of homemade pipe bombs while in school.' 61 The authorities had obtained a palm print from an unexploded bomb as well as
fragments from other bombs which may have had additional fingerprints.'

These facts provided a specific basis for the juvenile, judge to

suspect the juvenile was involved in criminal activity. 6 a
The Ohio Supreme Court held that there was sufficient law enforcement interest to justify the intrusion because there was a possibil-

156. 638 P.2d at 32.
157. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
158. Id. In Madson, the Colorado court concluded that the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in a number of search and seizure cases suggest that there can be a limited intrusion on
an individual's privacy on less than probable cause without violating the fourth amendment guarantee of reasonableness. 638 P.2d at 31-32. The Colorado court reasoned that four conditions
must be met in order for these limited intrusions to be within the fourth amendment provisions.
First, there must be an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting criminal activity
at the onset. Second, the intrusion must be limited in scope, purpose and duration. Third,
the intrusion must be justified by substantial law enforcement interests. Last, there must be
an opportunity at some point to subject the intrusion to the neutral and detached scrutiny
of a judicial officer before the evidence obtained therefrom may. be admitted in a criminal
proceeding against the accused.
Id. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this fourth requirement as inapplicable to the purposes for
which § 2151.313 was enacted. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
159. -42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
160. Id. at 124, 537 N.E.2d at 1287.
161. Id. at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
162. Id.
163. Id. The nature of the criminal activity itself was not specified in the opinion. The
possession of a pipe bomb could be a violation of § 2923.17. Since one of the explosions being
investigated occurred at the local high school, there may have been an issue of whether or not the
juvenile could be prosecuted under the arson statutes. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 125, 537 N.E.2d at 1287.
See statutes cited supra note 35.
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ity that there may be future pipe bomb explosions."" The concern for
the safety of the public provided an additional law enforcement interest

for the intrusion. 1 "
Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the intrusion
was adequately limited in scope, purpose and duration to allow it without a showing of probable cause. The court reasoned that the intrusion
was sufficiently confined because the order "was limited to the taking
of the juvenile to the police station for the sole purpose, of

fingerprinting."

6

The majority opinion also cited statutes and rules enacted by other

states which authorize orders for obtaining nontestimonial evidence
from suspects even though there is less than probable cause for an arrest.1 0 However, the opinion did not discuss the cases, also cited by the
United States Supreme Court in Hayes,16 8 which declined to follow
Madson's reasoning. 69

For example, the New York Court of Appeals, in its decision of In

re an Investigation into the Death of Abe A., 170 ruled that the state
must have probable cause to compel a suspect to submit a blood sample

when under criminal investigation.1 71 The In re Abe A. court coupled
the probable cause requirement with a balancing of the state and indi-

vidual interests involved to define what it determined would be a "strin17 2
gent standard.
New York does not have a statute or rule of criminal procedure

similar to those in Ohio17 s and Colorado1 74 which authorize a judge to
164. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
165. Id. However, under this reasoning, any law enforcement official could argue that the
interest in preventing additional criminal acts justifies searches or seizures on less than probable
cause during the course of a criminal investigation.
166. Id.
167. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1288. The statutes the court cited were, according to the opinion, indicative that other legislatures had been persuaded by the dicta in Davis v.
Mississippi and Hayes v. Florida. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E. 2d at 1288. See statutes cited
supra note 5.
168. 470 U.S. at 817.
169. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788 (1983); In re an Investigation
into the Death of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265 (1982).
170. 56 N.Y.2d 288, 291, 437 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1982). Specifically, the court held that the
State must "establish (1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2) a
'clear indication' that relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure
it is safe and reliable." Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. The court mandated that "the issuing court must weigh the seriousness of the
crime, the importance of the evidence to the investigation and the unavailability of less intrusive
means of obtaining it, on the one hand, against concern for the suspect's constitutional right to be
free from bodily intrusion on the other." Id.
173. § 2151.313.
174. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(1).
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order a suspect to provide nontestimonial evidence absent probable
cause." 5 However, the New York court considered state statutes with
such provisions and concluded that the state decisions 176 upholding
such statutes were not constitutionally firm.177 In the In re Abe A.
court's judgment, "whatever doubt dicta may have introduced into the
subject in Davis v. Mississippi has been dispelled by Dunaway y. New
York which squarely held that the seizure of a person can never be
undertaken for less than probable cause."' 7 8 The In re Abe A. court
reasoned that, when the physical evidence which is sought can not be
altered or destroyed (as is the case with blood types or fingerprints), no
special circumstances exist which would justify an exemption from the
warrant standard of probable cause prior to detention.'
In State v. Evans,180 the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the
state's Identifying Physical Characteristics Act. 1 ' The statute does not
explicitly require that the order be based on probable cause that the
suspect has committed the crime; it does require probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. 82 The Evans court, following
reasoning similar to that used by the In re Abe A. court in its decision, 183 concluded that there must be probable cause to issue a warrant
for detention to obtain nontestimonial evidence.' 8 In interpreting the
statute, the Nebraska court implied a requirement of probable cause to
believe that the person to be seized has committed an identifiable offense prior to the court's issuing the requisite order.' 85

175. 56 N.Y.2d at 293-94, 437 N.E.2d at 268.
176. E.g., State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 (1975);
State v. Watson, 294 N.C. 159, 240 S.E.2d 440 (1978).
177. 56 N.Y.2d at 295, 437 N.E.2d at 269.
178. Id. (citations omitted). It should be noted that the In re Abe A. opinion was written in
1982, prior to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the Davis v. Mississippi dicta in Hayes v.
Florida. See 470 U.S. at 817.
179. 56 N.Y. 2d at 296, 437 N.E.2d at 269.
180. 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788 (1983).
181. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3303 (1979).
182. Id. The statute provides:
The order may issue upon a showing by affidavit of a peace officer that (1)there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed; (2) that procurement of evidence
of identifying physical characteristics through nontestimonial identification procedures
from an identified or particularly described individual may contribute to the identification
of the individual who committed such offense; and (3) that the identified or described individual has refused, or there is reason to believe he will refuse, to voluntarily provide the
desired evidence of identifying physical characteristics.
Id.
183. 56 N.Y.2d at 295, 437 N.E.2d at 269.
184. 215 Neb. at 440, 338 N.W.2d at 793. The Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted.Dunaway v. New York as mandating probable cause for seizures for identification purposes. Id.
185. Id. at 441, 338 N.W.2d at 794. The court reviewed the provisions of Arizona Revised
Statute, § 13-3905, which authorizes detentions for nontestimonial identification on "reasonable
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By not reviewing these two decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court

majority opinion fails to provide a balanced view of the range of current interpretations of the validity of orders for fingerprint detention
absent probable cause. The court presents the interpretation that supports its conclusion,18 6 without acknowledging that other states have
it as not being within the constraints of
considered its view and 1rejected
87
the fourth amendment.
In his dissent, Justice Sweeney stated that he believed that the

majority had "misconstrue [d] the structure and intent of R.C.
2151.313" and ignored the requirements of the fourth amendment and
In Justice Sweeney's view section
the Ohio Constitution. 8
2151.313(A)(1) authorizes issuance of a search warrant which allows a

police officer to intrude on the rights of a private citizen in a manner
which, without the warrant, would be impermissible under the state

and federal constitutions.' 89
Justice Sweeney contended that the majority's construction of the

statute rendered the juvenile's right to constitutional protections meaningless.' 90 In his opinion, the statute, in order to be constitutional, must

be interpreted as requiring probable cause.' 9 ' Justice Sweeney reviewed
the Davis v. Mississippi 92 discussion of fingerprinting and concluded
that "[w]hile [the Court's] observation . . . may be construed to per-

mit judicially authorized fingerprinting on less that probable cause, a
more reasonable interpretation would be that such procedure would re9 3 He then considered
quire an order predicated upon probabie cause."'1

grounds" and concluded:
Unlike the Arizona Supreme Court, though, we are not willing to follow the suggestion of the Davis dictum that seizures for the purpose of compelling nontestimonial identification evidence under § 29-3303 are permissible, under either the fourth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution or article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, on a showing of less than
probable cause to believe the person to be seized and compelled to submit to identification
procedures committed the crime under investigation.
Id. at 439-40, 338 N.W.2d at 793.
186. The court cited as authority People v. Madson, 42 Ohio St. 3d at 126, 537 N.E.2d at
1288.
187. See cases cited supra note 169.
188. 42 Ohio St. 3d. at 128, 537 N.E.2d at 1289 (Sweeney, J., dissenting).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 128, 537 N.E.2d at 1290.
191. Id. at 129,.537 N.E.2d at 1291. The dissent came to this conclusion after discussing
the general concepts of statutory interpretation which compel a court to (1) presume acts of the
legislature are enacted with an awareness of the requirements of the state and federal constitutions and (2) choose an interpretation which will uphold the statute's validity "where legislation is
susceptible to both a constitutional and an unconstitutional interpretation." Id. at 128, 537 N.E.2d
at 1290.
192. 394 U.S. 721, 726-28 (1969).
193. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 129, 537 N.E.2d at 1290-91.
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the majority's reliance on statements made in Hayes v. Florida,9 4 and
concluded that the majority's interpretation would "render the acquisition of an order a mere formality since an order (or warrant) not based
upon probable cause amounts to a nullity.' 9 8
Finally, Justice Sweeney pointed out that section 2151.313 applies
only to juveniles. 19 In his analysis, that fact mandated a conclusion
that the statute be interpreted "to provide procedural protections to
juveniles above and beyond those constitutionally mandated with respect to adults."' 9 He said the statute should be interpreted so that
section 2151.313(A)(2) is an exception to the requirements established
by section 2151.313(A)(1).1 98 It would be logical that, since section
2151.313(A)(2)' 99 provides an exception for fingerprinting and
photographing absent an order under stated conditions, section
2151.313(A)(1) establishes an order requirement, supported by proba-

ble cause 00
Justice Douglas dissented with a brief statement that, in his view,
the majority's judgment had "abolish[ed] the Fourth Amendment as to
juveniles, a concept with which I am unfamiliar." 0 ' He concluded that
section 2151.313 has no application until after a juvenile.has been apprehended based on probable cause. 02
B. Is In re Order Requiring Fingerprintingof a Juvenile Within
Traditional Fourth Amendment Requirements or the Recognized
Exceptions?

Analysis of the soundness of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
.requires consideration of the constraints the fourth amendment imposes

194. The United States Supreme Court stated in Hayes: "such seizures, at least where not
under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests
may constitutionally be made only on probable cause." 470 U.S. at 816. Justice Sweeney suggests
that the majority attempts to distinguish Davis and Hayes from the juvenile's case by arguing
that either probable cause or judicial authorization, but not both, is necessary to validate the
search. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 129, 537 N.E.2d at 1291.
195. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 129-30, 537 N.E.2d at 1291.
196. Id. at 130, 537 N.E.2d at 1291. Ohio does not have a criminal statute similar to §
2151.313 which allows, on less than probable cause, the detention of adulfs for the purpose of
obtaining nontestimonial evidence. The criminal code requires that probable cause exist before
any warrant for search or seizure is issued. § 2933.22.
197. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 130, 537 N.E.2d at 1291.
198. Id.
199. This section of the statute stipulates the conditions under which a law enforcement
officer may, without prior consent of a juvenile judge, obtain a juvenile's fingerprints or photograph. § 2151.313(B)(2) (requiring that the juvenile be arrested or otherwise in custody for the
commission of an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult).
200. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 130, 537 N.E.2d at 1291-92.
201. Id. at 130, 537 .N.E.2d at 1292 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).
202. Id.
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and when those constraints may be relaxed. Within that context, an
assessment can be reached measuring the Ohio court's holding with
United States Supreme Court precedents. The fourth amendment is not
an absolute prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures.20 A
warrantless arrest is permitted in circumstances where the law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed a felony or a misdemeanor and apprehension is unlikely unless
immediate action is taken, or the individual has committed an offense
in the officer's presence .2 Since the In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting of a Juvenile prosecutor was not seeking to arrest the juve-

nile, 05 the above noted exceptions to the warrant requirement are inapplicable to the case. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court
has narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant or probable cause re-

quirement based on the presence of exigent circumstances, an administrative search, or a special relationship between the parties. The Ohio
decision will be considered in light of each of these exceptions.
The United States Supreme Court has also identified exigent circumstances under which the law enforcement officers are empowered to

search or seize without a warrant even though there is not probable

cause for a warrantless arrest.2 08 In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting

of a Juvenile did not fall under any of these exigent circumstances. The
juvenile did not present an immediate threat to a law enforcement officer or to community safety.207 His detention for fingerprinting absent
a probable cause warrant can not be justified under the guise of protecting the safety of the officer or the community. Fingerprints are not
destructible, therefore, it is not arguable that the juvenile's detention

203. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976) (inquiry is not whether
there is a warrant but whether there is probable cause for the arrest).
204. Id. at 422 n. 11. See also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
205. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 124, 537 N.E.2d at 1287. The prosector sought the warrant to obtain
the fingerprints because the. fire district officials suspected that the juvenile had been involved in
the pipe bombings. Id. There was no indication in the facts presented in the opinion that the
officials had observed the juvenile in any illegal activity or that there was probable cause for an
arrest, with or without a warrant.
206. See cases cited supra note 52.
207. The majority opinion recognized a substantial governmental interest in preventing further bombings, thus protecting the public safety. 42 Ohio St. 3d at 127, 537 N.E.2d at 1289.
However, this element is present in any criminal investigation. There is always a strong governmental interest in capturing the perpetrator and thus preventing further criminal activity. There
was no immediacy present in this case because the case did not involve a direct confrontation
between either a police officer or a member of the community with the individual suspected of
posing the threat. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1969) ("stop and frisk" search is justified when
a police officer is faced with an immediate confrontation with a suspicious individual who is potentially armed and dangerous); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)
(questioning of passengers in a vehicle near the United States-Mexican border is justified by the
immediate need to determine the citizenry of such passengers before they enter the country).
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was necessary to prevent destruction of evidence. There was also no
reason to expect that the juvenile would flee the county and not be
available for questioning or obtaining nontestimonial evidence after a
warrant was obtained. The absence of exigent circumstances indicates
that the Ohio court can not base its waiver of probable cause on these
recognized exceptions.
The Ohio Supreme Court's In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting

of a Juvenile decision concluded that section 2151.313(A)(1) authorizes seizures of juveniles on less than probable cause. The Ohio court's
conclusion may be understood by comparing the facts in the case with
United States Supreme Court decisions which allow searches under a
warrant issued by an administrative agency on less than probable
cause.
While there may be some similarities between the juvenile system
and an administrative agency, the goals of the two systems differ significantly. An administrative agency is a means by which a state enforces
regulation of unique problems which are not within the scope of the
criminal system." 8 The agency conducts searches to ensure that the
regulated community complies with agency regulations.
The penalties
209
for violation may be criminal as well as civil.
The Ohio juvenile system's goal is to "provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to [the
juvenile code]."2' The code explicitly states that it should be construed

"[t]o protect the public interest in removing the consequences of criminal behavior and the taint of criminality from children committing delinquent acts and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care,
and rehabilitation. ' 211 However, like an administrative agency's orders,
a juvenile order can result in criminal proceedings. 12
The United States Supreme Court stipulated that administrative
agencies can issue warrants on less than probable cause because of the
history of agency inspections, the public interest in attainment of
agency goals, and the limited nature of the invasion which is neither
personal nor aimed at discovering criminal evidence. 213 A similar anal-

208. See J.

ISRAEL & W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 187 (1985).
209. Camara v. Municipal Court 387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967). "Like most regulatory laws,
fire, health" and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes.. .. [R]efusal to comply [with
an administrative order] is a criminal offense .
Id.
210. § 2151.01(A).
211". § 2151.01(B).
212. See § 2151.26 (requirements for a juvenile court to transfer a juvenile to the criminal
system for prosecution).
213. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. Specifically, the Camara Court recognized that the history
of housing inspections indicated broad based acceptance by both the judiciary and citizenry that
such inspections are necessary and reasonable. Id. '
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ysis fails when applied to the juvenile system. There may be a long
history of supervision of juveniles through the juvenile system. However, the methods of supervising and handling juvenile delinquents have

changed radically throughout the years2"4 and there is still wide-spread
disagreement on what is the best way to rehabilitate juvenile delinquents.2 5 It is undeniable that the public has an interest in the attainment of the stated goals of the juvenile system. However, it would be
difficult to argue that the type of invasion allowed by section
2151.313(A)(1) 216 is not personal in nature 17 or that it is not aimed at
discovering criminal evidence. 18 Since the elements for justifying
searches on warrants issued on reasonable grounds are not met, it
would appear that section 2151.313(A)(1) orders are not within the.
Supreme Court's reasoning with regard to administrative searches. The
Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion can be compared to United States

Supreme Court decisions which allow warrantless searches on less than

214. See, e.g., In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 73, 249 N.E.2d 808, 810 (1969) (numerous
.reforms and refinements in juvenile law have occurred in the last century);
State v. Hale, 21 Ohio
App. 2d 207, 212, 256 N.E.2d 239, 243 (1969) (treatment of juveniles changed from no differentiation between adults and minors of the age of criminal responsibility to protection and reformation of the errant youth).
215. See, e.g., Rangel, Juvenile Justice: A Need to Reexamine Goals & Methods, 5 CAP.
U.L. REV. 149, 172 (1976) (juvenile system has failed to reach its goals and a nationwide system
is needed to establish common goals and resolve the issue of punishment versus rehabilitation);
Rector & Van Duizend, New Directionsfor Juvenile Justice, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 347, 348 (1978)
(calling for changes in the area of rights and procedures in juvenile court proceedings, rights and
policies in juvenile correctional programs, and for the deinstitutionalization of non-offenders).
216. Section 2151.313 governs the procedure for obtaining fingerprints and photographs of
juveniles.
217. The United States Supreme Court recognized in Hayes v. Florida that fingerprinting,
although it does not involve the repeated harassment or probing into an individual's private life
and thoughts that other investigatory procedures entail, is still an intrusion on personal security.
470 U.S. 811, 814 (1985).
218. Although, as the State v. Carder opinion pointed out, juvenile proceedings are not
inherently criminal in nature, it is possible for such actions to ultimately result in criminal proceedings. 9 Ohio St. 2d 1, 11, 222 N.E.2d 620, 627 (1966). The juvenile code authorizes a court
to transfer a juvenile case for criminal prosecution when four circumstances exist. § 2151.26.
There must be a complaint alleging the child is-delinquent because he committed an act which
would be a felony if committed by an adult. Id. The child must be fifteen or older at the time the
act was committed. Id. There must be probable cause to believe that the child committed the act.
Id. There must be an indication that the child is not amenable to care or rehabilitation as a
juvenile or the transfer to the criminal system is in the interest of the community's safety. Id.
Although there is no indication in the case of the age of the juvenile in question, it is possible that
he might be fifteen or older since there was a bombing at the high school and the age of high
school children typically ranges from fourteen to eighteen. Therefore, there is the potential that
the fingerprint evidence may provide the probable cause needed to believe that the juvenile committed the pipe bombings. Since setting a bomb would be a felony if committed by an adult, there
is the potential that the result of the juvenile proceeding could be criminal prosecution of the
juvenile. § 2909.02 (aggravated arson, aggravated felony of first degree); § 2909.03 (arson, felony
of third degree); § 2923.17 (possession of a dangerous ordinance, felony of fourth degree).
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probable cause due to the existence of a special relationship between
the official conducting the search and the individual subject to that
search. 19 However, the comparison indicates that the principles the
Court used to allow such warrantless searches are not applicable to the
Ohio juvenile system.
The juvenile system's relationship with juvenile delinquents may
be compared with the school administration's relationship with its students. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 2 2 0 the United, States Supreme Court
recognized that the fourth amendment's restraints apply to school officials who, acting as representatives of the state, carry out searches or
other disciplinary functions because the student has fourth amendment
rights.22 1 Similarly, a juvenile is entitled to the protections of the fourth
amendment despite the fact he is subject to the juvenile court's
jurisdiction. 2 2
Students have a legitimate expectation of privacy while on school
grounds; they may lawfully bring items onto school property which,
though unrelated to supplies needed for their studies, the student may
rightfully expect to be free from search or confiscation by teachers or
administrators.223 Since a juvenile is entitled to the same protections of
the fourth amendment as an adult, his expectation of privacy in his
own home is similar, and it would follow that he has the same interest
as an adult has to be free from government intrusions in his home.
In order to preserve the control required in the school environment, the Supreme Court held that school officials need not obtain a
warrant or have probable cause grounds before searching a student who
is under their authority.22 4 Analogous reasoning is not applicable to the
juvenile system. The juvenile judge may have the same interest in preserving order in the community as the school official has in preserving
order in the schools. However, the circumstances which justify relaxing
the warrant and probable cause requirements in the school environment
do not exist within the juvenile system. Requiring an order does not
interfere with the juvenile judge's ability to perform his duties.223 The

219. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
220. 469 U.S. at 325.
221. Id. at 336.
222. See In re Order Requiring Fingerprinting of a Juvenile, 42 Ohio St. 3d 124, 126, 537
N.E.2d 1286, 1287, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 165 (interim ed. 1989).
223. 469 U.S. at 339.
224. Id. at 340-41.
225. One of the justifications for not requiring a warrant in the school environment is the
fact that "requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools." Id. at 340. One of the juvenile
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juvenile judge is familiar with the probable cause standard and applies
it in other situations within the scope of his assignments.2 26 Therefore,
the reasoning the Supreme Court employed in T.L.O. to relax the probable cause standard to one of "reasonableness" is not warranted in the
case of a juvenile court judge who is reviewing an application for an
order for fingerprinting under section 2151.313(A) (1).21
The parallel between the probation and juvenile systems is obvious. The probation system is geared toward rehabilitation of the probationer and, simultaneously, protection of the community through the
imposition of probation conditions.22 8 The juvenile system is structured
to provide protection of both the juvenile and the community and is
aimed at the rehabilitation of delinquent juveniles. 2 9
There is one significant difference; the probationer has committed
a crime and has been convicted. Probation is part of his punishment. 3 °
The juvenile is subject to the protections of the juvenile code even
before he is adjudicated delinquent; the juvenile court's jurisdiction is
not predicated on a prior conviction. Since one of the goals of the juvenile system is to remove "consequences of criminal behavior and the
taint of criminality from children committing delinquent acts,"'2 3 ' it
would be logical to infer that the Ohio legislature intends to provide
greater protection to the juvenile than he would receive if subject to the
adult system. In light of the above analysis and accepting the Ohio
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 2151.313(A) (1) as allowing
orders to be issued without a finding of probable cause, the majority
opinion has effectively lessened the protection afforded to juveniles.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Hayes v. Florida,132 the United States Supreme Court acknowl-

judge's duties is to authorize orders for law enforcement action. It would not interfere with the
judge's responsibilities or require him to act beyond his sphere of knowledge if he has to hear
evidence to establish probable cause before issuing an order.
226. For example, a juvenile judge applies the probable cause standard in reviewing an
application to transfer a juvenile's case for criminal prosecution. § 2151.26 (probable cause to
believe that the child has committed the offense).
227. The Court reasoned that use of a reasonableness standard would "spare teachers and
school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause." 469
U.S. at 343.
228. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987). "[Probation] restrictions are
meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large." Id.
229. § 2151.01.
230. 483 U.S. at 874. "Probation is simply one point ... on a continuum of possible punishments." Id.
231. § 2151.01(B).
232. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
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edged that the states have responded inconsistently to the Davis v. Mississippi"'3 dicta which suggested the possibility that a limited intrusion
for the purposes of obtaining fingerprints may be within the scope of
the fourth amendment restraints without a finding of probable cause."'
The Ohio Supreme Court cast its ballot in favor of searches under an
order lacking probable cause when it affirmed the court of appeals' decision in In re Order Requiring Fingerprintingof a Juvenile."'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a number of exigent circumstances which justify either relaxing or waiving the probable cause requirement. Circumstances requiring urgent law enforcement. action, administrative searches, and special relationships are the
primary grounds for granting exceptions to the fourth amendment rule
that a warrant be issued on probable cause. The Supreme Court's hint
that limited seizures for evidence such as fingerprints may be permissible absent probable cause does not fit into one of the recognized exceptions, nor do the principles supporting these exceptions seem to apply to
detentions for nontestimonial evidence. Since the states are in disagreement about the constitutionality of such searches, the validity of the
Ohio Supreme Court's decision may depend on future review of this
issue by the United States Supreme Court.
Karen R. Koehler

233.
234.
235.

394 U.S. 721 (1969).
470 U.S. at 817.
42 Ohio St. 3d 124, 537 N.E.2d 1286, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 165 (interim ed. 1989).
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